Older versions of rpc.statd and automountd for various platforms allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands and gain root privileges. Sun patches available.
a0f5e7d59ed9d1715787e9727cd5e407fdcf54f089374dbd6430da9214cb1c93Date: Mon, 7 Jun 1999 11:29:55 -0700
From: Sun Security Coordination Team <secure@sunsc.Eng.Sun.COM>
To: CWS@sunsc.Eng.Sun.COM
Subject: Sun Security Bulletin #00186
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
________________________________________________________________________________
Sun Microsystems, Inc. Security Bulletin
Bulletin Number: #00186
Date: June 7, 1999
Cross-Ref:
Title: rpc.statd
________________________________________________________________________________
The information contained in this Security Bulletin is provided "AS IS."
Sun makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect to the information
contained in this Security Bulletin. ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONDITIONS,
REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES, INCLUDING ANY WARRANTY OF NON-INFRINGEMENT OR
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ARE
HEREBY DISCLAIMED AND EXCLUDED TO THE EXTENT ALLOWED BY APPLICABLE LAW.
IN NO EVENT WILL SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC. BE LIABLE FOR ANY LOST REVENUE,
PROFIT OR DATA, OR FOR DIRECT, SPECIAL, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, INCIDENTAL
OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES HOWEVER CAUSED AND REGARDLESS OF ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY
ARISING OUT OF THE USE OF OR INABILITY TO USE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN
THIS SECURITY BULLETIN, EVEN IF SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC. HAS BEEN ADVISED OF
THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
If any of the above provisions are held to be in violation of applicable law,
void, or unenforceable in any jurisdiction, then such provisions are waived
to the extent necessary for this disclaimer to be otherwise enforceable in
such jurisdiction.
________________________________________________________________________________
1. Bulletins Topics
Sun announces the release of patches for Solaris(tm) 2.6, 2.5.1,
2.5, 2.4, and 2.3 (SunOS(tm) 5.6, 5.5.1, 5.5, 5.4 and 5.3), which
relate to a vulnerability involving rpc.statd.
Sun recommends that you install the patches listed in section 4
immediately on systems running SunOS 5.6, 5.5.1, 5.5, 5.4, and 5.3.
2. Who is Affected
Vulnerable: SunOS 5.6, 5.6_x86, 5.5.1, 5.5.1_x86, 5.5, 5.5_x86,
5.4, 5.4_x86, and 5.3.
Not vulnerable: All other supported versions of SunOS.
3. Understanding the Vulnerability
rpc.statd is the NFS file-locking status monitor. It interacts with
rpc.lockd to provide the crash and recovery functions for file locking
across NFS. rpc.statd allows indirect RPC calls to other RPC services.
Because rpc.statd runs as root, this allows remote attackers to bypass
access controls of other RPC services.
4. List of Patches
The following patches are available in relation to the above problem.
OS Version Patch ID
__________ _________
SunOS 5.6 106592-02
SunOS 5.6_x86 106593-02
SunOS 5.5.1 104166-04
SunOS 5.5.1_x86 104167-04
SunOS 5.5 103468-04
SunOS 5.5_x86 103469-05
SunOS 5.4 102769-07
SunOS 5.4_x86 102770-07
SunOS 5.3 102932-05
_______________________________________________________________________________
APPENDICES
A. Patches listed in this bulletin are available to all Sun customers at:
http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/show.pl?target=patches/patch-license&nav=pub-patches
B. Checksums for the patches listed in this bulletin are available at:
ftp://sunsolve.sun.com/pub/patches/CHECKSUMS
C. Sun security bulletins are available at:
http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/secBulletin.pl
D. Sun Security Coordination Team's PGP key is available at:
http://sunsolve.sun.com/pgpkey.txt
E. To report or inquire about a security problem with Sun software, contact
one or more of the following:
- Your local Sun answer centers
- Your representative computer security response team, such as CERT
- Sun Security Coordination Team. Send email to:
security-alert@sun.com
F. To receive information or subscribe to our CWS (Customer Warning System)
mailing list, send email to:
security-alert@sun.com
with a subject line (not body) containing one of the following commands:
Command Information Returned/Action Taken
_______ _________________________________
help An explanation of how to get information
key Sun Security Coordination Team's PGP key
list A list of current security topics
query [topic] The email is treated as an inquiry and is forwarded to
the Security Coordination Team
report [topic] The email is treated as a security report and is
forwarded to the Security Coordination Team. Please
encrypt sensitive mail using Sun Security Coordination
Team's PGP key
send topic A short status summary or bulletin. For example, to
retrieve a Security Bulletin #00138, supply the
following in the subject line (not body):
send #138
subscribe Sender is added to our mailing list. To subscribe,
supply the following in the subject line (not body):
subscribe cws your-email-address
Note that your-email-address should be substituted
by your email address.
unsubscribe Sender is removed from the CWS mailing list.
________________________________________________________________________________
Copyright 1999 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. Sun,
Sun Microsystems, Solaris and SunOS are trademarks or registered trademarks
of Sun Microsystems, Inc. in the United States and other countries. This
Security Bulletin may be reproduced and distributed, provided that this
Security Bulletin is not modified in any way and is attributed to
Sun Microsystems, Inc. and provided that such reproduction and distribution
is performed for non-commercial purposes.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2
iQCVAwUBN1v0lrdzzzOFBFjJAQFBRwQAuf9lbE6VUaMPIZ2nBiiVXuRsmLJqIQUQ
zZvGpx9//DO5UQt4U/kOMmyv8m8SSNCoZfrmu4I7WqiX1OKvr+H9FLR6OEnUVqPC
7hLQl0PBmkcLkRsUpFvEG4zTnI4D7SUcWb5rOcUYdpWF/XUnjRp9Yx0wbQClWvG2
ZxBjl97qw1Y=
=07wv
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 1999 16:27:53 -0400
From: CERT Advisory <cert-advisory@cert.org>
Reply-To: cert-advisory-request@cert.org
To: cert-advisory@coal.cert.org
Subject: CERT Advisory CA-99.05 - statd-automountd
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
CERT Advisory CA-99-05 Vulnerability in statd exposes vulnerability in
automountd
Original issue date: June 9, 1999
Source: CERT/CC
Systems Affected
Systems running older versions of rpc.statd and automountd
I. Description
This advisory describes two vulnerabilities that are being used
together by intruders to gain access to vulnerable systems. The first
vulnerability is in rpc.statd, a program used to communicate state
changes among NFS clients and servers. The second vulnerability is in
automountd, a program used to automatically mount certain types of
file systems. Both of these vulnerabilities have been widely discussed
on public forums, such as BugTraq, and some vendors have issued
security advisories related to the problems discussed here. Because of
the number of incident reports we have received, however, we are
releasing this advisory to call attention to these problems so that
system and network administrators who have not addressed these
problems do so immediately.
The vulnerability in rpc.statd allows an intruder to call arbitrary
rpc services with the privileges of the rpc.statd process. The called
rpc service may be a local service on the same machine or it may be a
network service on another machine. Although the form of the call is
constrained by rpc.statd, if the call is acceptable to another rpc
service, the other rpc service will act on the call as if it were an
authentic call from the rpc.statd process.
The vulnerability in automountd allows a local intruder to execute
arbitrary commands with the privileges of the automountd process. This
vulnerability has been widely known for a significant period of time,
and patches have been available from vendors, but many systems remain
vulnerable because their administrators have not yet applied the
appropriate patches.
By exploiting these two vulnerabilities simultaneously, a remote
intruder is able to "bounce" rpc calls from the rpc.statd service to
the automountd service on the same targeted machine. Although on many
systems the automountd service does not normally accept traffic from
the network, this combination of vulnerabilities allows a remote
intruder to execute arbitrary commands with the administrative
privileges of the automountd service, typically root.
Note that the rpc.statd vulnerability described in this advisory is
distinct from the vulnerabilities described in CERT Advisories
CA-96.09 and CA-97.26.
II. Impact
The vulnerability in rpc.statd may allow a remote intruder to call
arbitrary rpc services with the privileges of the rpc.statd process,
typically root. The vulnerablility in automountd may allow a local
intruder to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the
automountd service.
By combining attacks exploiting these two vulnerabilities, a remote
intruder is able to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of
the automountd service.
Note
It may still be possible to cause rpc.statd to call other rpc services
even after applying patches which reduce the privileges of rpc.statd.
If there are additional vulnerabilities in other rpc services
(including services you have written), an intruder may be able to
exploit those vulnerabilities through rpc.statd. At the present time,
we are unaware of any such vulnerabilitity that may be exploited
through this mechanism.
III. Solutions
Install a patch from your vendor
Appendix A contains input from vendors who have provided information
for this advisory. We will update the appendix as we receive more
information. If you do not see your vendor's name, the CERT/CC did not
hear from that vendor. Please contact your vendor directly.
Appendix A: Vendor Information
Caldera
Caldera's currently not shipping statd.
Compaq Computer Corporation
(c) Copyright 1998, 1999 Compaq Computer Corporation. All rights
reserved.
SOURCE: Compaq Computer Corporation
Compaq Services
Software Security Response Team USA
This reported problem has not been found to affect the as
shipped, Compaq's Tru64/UNIX Operating Systems Software.
- Compaq Computer Corporation
Data General
We are investigating. We will provide an update when our
investigation is complete.
Hewlett-Packard Company
HP is not vulnerable.
The Santa Cruz Operation, Inc.
No SCO products are vulnerable.
Silicon Graphics, Inc.
% IRIX
% rpc.statd
IRIX 6.2 and above ARE NOT vulnerable.
IRIX 5.3 is vulnerable, but no longer supported.
% automountd
With patches from SGI Security Advisory
19981005-01-PX installed,
IRIX 6.2 and above ARE NOT vulnerable.
% Unicos
Currently, SGI is investigating and no further information
is
available for public release at this time.
As further information becomes available, additional
advisories
will be issued via the normal SGI security information
distribution
method including the wiretap mailing list.
SGI Security Headquarters
http://www.sgi.com/Support/security
Sun Microsystems Inc.
The following patches are available:
rpc.statd:
Patch OS Version
_____ __________
106592-02 SunOS 5.6
106593-02 SunOS 5.6_x86
104166-04 SunOS 5.5.1
104167-04 SunOS 5.5.1_x86
103468-04 SunOS 5.5
103469-05 SunOS 5.5_x86
102769-07 SunOS 5.4
102770-07 SunOS 5.4_x86
102932-05 SunOS 5.3
The fix for this vulnerability was integrated in SunOS
5.7 (Solaris 7) before it was released.
automountd:
104654-05 SunOS 5.5.1
104655-05 SunOS 5.5.1_x86
103187-43 SunOS 5.5
103188-43 SunOS 5.5_x86
101945-61 SunOS 5.4
101946-54 SunOS 5.4_x86
101318-92 SunOS 5.3
SunOS 5.6 (Solaris 2.6) and SunOS 5.7 (Solaris 7) are not
vulnerable.
Sun security patches are available at:
http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/show.pl?target=patches/patch-li
cense&nav=pub-patches
_______________________________________________________________
Our thanks to Olaf Kirch of Caldera for his assistance in
helping us understand the problem and Chok Poh of Sun
Microsystems for his assistance in helping us construct this
advisory.
_______________________________________________________________
This document is available from:
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-99-05-statd-automountd.html.
_______________________________________________________________
CERT/CC Contact Information
Email: cert@cert.org
Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
Fax: +1 412-268-6989
Postal address:
CERT Coordination Center
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
U.S.A.
CERT personnel answer the hotline 08:00-20:00 EST(GMT-5) /
EDT(GMT-4) Monday through Friday; they are on call for
emergencies during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on
weekends.
Using encryption
We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by
email. Our public PGP key is available from
http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key. If you prefer to use DES,
please call the CERT hotline for more information.
Getting security information
CERT publications and other security information are available
from our web site http://www.cert.org/.
To be added to our mailing list for advisories and bulletins,
send email to cert-advisory-request@cert.org and include
SUBSCRIBE your-email-address in the subject of your message.
Copyright 1999 Carnegie Mellon University.
Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information
can be found in http://www.cert.org/legal_stuff.html.
* "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
_______________________________________________________________
NO WARRANTY
Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the
Software Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is"
basis. Carnegie Mellon University makes no warranties of any
kind, either expressed or implied as to any matter including,
but not limited to, warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or results obtained
from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University does not
make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from
patent, trademark, or copyright infringement.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2
iQCVAwUBN17H2HVP+x0t4w7BAQHspgP+JHCLMDLqm+n64pito2B5jQijAKkK0yEK
P3/Lb8ZVgHgzAG9SuuOqBXY9ZxpaxM/gUEE3u4MAyo4ykJi6t3cMQfVDN0h+Ivn4
hogmZa+Z4GeocXNvC6KF0KvTA/wgDvA45EXZTJM9tDYNhc93yEJBmUZl7v36WXWM
nJ+/XDo+EP4=
=fAiP
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 1999 09:18:20 -0700
From: Mark Zielinski <markz@SECURITY.INFICAD.COM>
To: BUGTRAQ@netspace.org
Subject: Re: CERT Advisory CA-99.05 - statd-automountd
This CERT Advisory has failed to mention a few things that I would like to
point out.
CERT Advisory CA-99.05 reports SunOS 5.6 automountd as not being susceptible
to the rpc.statd bounce attack. This is incorrect. SunOS 5.6 is indeed
vulnerable, it is just harder to exploit because it involves DNS spoofing.
Solaris 7 is not vulnerable because the RPC services are no longer run as
root and automountd will only accept connections from a uid of zero. This
has nothing to due with Sun incorporating a patch into version 7.
System Administrators should also consider the following. A system
running SunOS 5.5.1 with a patched automountd (that has not patched rpc.statd)
is STILL vulnerable. This is because the automountd patch for SunOS 5.5.1
only stops non-root local users from specifying the command to be run for
mounting filesystems. Any system running rpc.statd in this situation as
root (which is default) can still be exploited remotely.
System administrators should also take note that simply disabling rpcbind
will not stop this problem from being exploited.
Both SUN Microsystems and CERT fail to mention that earlier versions of
SunOS are also affected. I understand that most systems these days are
not running these versions, however patches and advisories should still be
released for those who are running them.
SunOS versions 4.1.3 and 4.1.4 are still vulnerable to the rpc.statd
bounce attack with no patches currently released.
Best regards,
Mark Zielinski
System Security Engineer
Inficad Communications
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.6.2
mQCNAzdE6tAAAAEEAMfnIe65PMbIGxZsegpaMME7hSxpJ0HsM0G9hrkR+EXXOLnH
Rn6oFnaR8mKLGW+3LyAVrDE34O87EyaQ8GKqpDlN9n3wLn7Wm5WuCCRJvEHxwCZZ
XgQpQoCMQEZNexal3dwVJNRKAvWDFE+rltplYLM8uGLyDnaXOt6aFnLygXxNAAUR
tA5NYXJrIFppZWxpbnNraQ==
=+Gj/
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 1999 13:10:19 -0700 (PDT)
From: CIAC Mail User <ciac@rumpole.llnl.gov>
To: ciac-bulletin@rumpole.llnl.gov
Subject: CIAC Bulletin J-045: Vulnerability in statd exposes vulnerability in automountd
[ For Public Release ]
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
__________________________________________________________
The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
___ __ __ _ ___
/ | /_\ /
\___ __|__ / \ \___
__________________________________________________________
INFORMATION BULLETIN
Vulnerability in statd exposes vulnerability in automountd
June 10, 1999 21:00 GMT Number J-045
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: Two vulnerabilities are address in this advisory:
1) rpc.statd, a program used to communicate state changes among
NFS clients and servers.
2) automountd, a program used to automatically mount certain
types of file systems.
By exploiting these two vulnerabilities simultaneously, a
Remote intruder is able to "bounce" rpc calls from the
rpc.statd service to the automountd service on the same
targeted machine.
PLATFORM: SGI IRIX 5.3 is vulnerable to rpc.statd but no longer
supported. Unpatched IRIX 6.2 and above are vulnerable
to automountd.
SunOS 5.6, 5.6_x86, 5.5.1, 5.5.1_x86, 5.5, 5.5_x86,
5.4, 5.4_x86, and 5.3.
DAMAGE: This combination of vulnerabilities allows a remote
intruder to execute arbitrary commands with the administrative
privileges of the automountd service, typically root.
SOLUTION: Apply the vendor-supplied patch.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY Risk is high due to these vulnerabilities having been widely
ASSESSMENT: discussed on public forums such as BugTraq.
______________________________________________________________________________
[ Start CERT Advisory ]
CERT Advisory CA-99-05 Vulnerability in statd exposes vulnerability in
automountd
Original issue date: June 9, 1999
Source: CERT/CC
Systems Affected
Systems running older versions of rpc.statd and automountd
I. Description
This advisory describes two vulnerabilities that are being used
together by intruders to gain access to vulnerable systems. The first
vulnerability is in rpc.statd, a program used to communicate state
changes among NFS clients and servers. The second vulnerability is in
automountd, a program used to automatically mount certain types of
file systems. Both of these vulnerabilities have been widely discussed
on public forums, such as BugTraq, and some vendors have issued
security advisories related to the problems discussed here. Because of
the number of incident reports we have received, however, we are
releasing this advisory to call attention to these problems so that
system and network administrators who have not addressed these
problems do so immediately.
The vulnerability in rpc.statd allows an intruder to call arbitrary
rpc services with the privileges of the rpc.statd process. The called
rpc service may be a local service on the same machine or it may be a
network service on another machine. Although the form of the call is
constrained by rpc.statd, if the call is acceptable to another rpc
service, the other rpc service will act on the call as if it were an
authentic call from the rpc.statd process.
The vulnerability in automountd allows a local intruder to execute
arbitrary commands with the privileges of the automountd process. This
vulnerability has been widely known for a significant period of time,
and patches have been available from vendors, but many systems remain
vulnerable because their administrators have not yet applied the
appropriate patches.
By exploiting these two vulnerabilities simultaneously, a remote
intruder is able to "bounce" rpc calls from the rpc.statd service to
the automountd service on the same targeted machine. Although on many
systems the automountd service does not normally accept traffic from
the network, this combination of vulnerabilities allows a remote
intruder to execute arbitrary commands with the administrative
privileges of the automountd service, typically root.
Note that the rpc.statd vulnerability described in this advisory is
distinct from the vulnerabilities described in CERT Advisories
CA-96.09 and CA-97.26.
II. Impact
The vulnerability in rpc.statd may allow a remote intruder to call
arbitrary rpc services with the privileges of the rpc.statd process,
typically root. The vulnerability in automountd may allow a local
intruder to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the
automountd service.
By combining attacks exploiting these two vulnerabilities, a remote
intruder is able to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of
the automountd service.
Note
It may still be possible to cause rpc.statd to call other rpc services
even after applying patches which reduce the privileges of rpc.statd.
If there are additional vulnerabilities in other rpc services
(including services you have written), an intruder may be able to
exploit those vulnerabilities through rpc.statd. At the present time,
we are unaware of any such vulnerabilitity that may be exploited
through this mechanism.
III. Solutions
Install a patch from your vendor
Appendix A contains input from vendors who have provided information
for this advisory. We will update the appendix as we receive more
information. If you do not see your vendor's name, the CERT/CC did not
hear from that vendor. Please contact your vendor directly.
Appendix A: Vendor Information
Caldera
Caldera's currently not shipping statd.
Compaq Computer Corporation
(c) Copyright 1998, 1999 Compaq Computer Corporation. All rights
reserved.
SOURCE: Compaq Computer Corporation
Compaq Services
Software Security Response Team USA
This reported problem has not been found to affect the as
shipped, Compaq's Tru64/UNIX Operating Systems Software.
- Compaq Computer Corporation
Data General
We are investigating. We will provide an update when our
investigation is complete.
Hewlett-Packard Company
HP is not vulnerable.
The Santa Cruz Operation, Inc.
No SCO products are vulnerable.
Silicon Graphics, Inc.
% IRIX
% rpc.statd
IRIX 6.2 and above ARE NOT vulnerable.
IRIX 5.3 is vulnerable, but no longer supported.
% automountd
With patches from SGI Security Advisory
19981005-01-PX installed,
IRIX 6.2 and above ARE NOT vulnerable.
% Unicos
Currently, SGI is investigating and no further information
is
available for public release at this time.
As further information becomes available, additional
advisories
will be issued via the normal SGI security information
distribution
method including the wiretap mailing list.
SGI Security Headquarters
http://www.sgi.com/Support/security
Sun Microsystems Inc.
The following patches are available:
rpc.statd:
Patch OS Version
_____ __________
106592-02 SunOS 5.6
106593-02 SunOS 5.6_x86
104166-04 SunOS 5.5.1
104167-04 SunOS 5.5.1_x86
103468-04 SunOS 5.5
103469-05 SunOS 5.5_x86
102769-07 SunOS 5.4
102770-07 SunOS 5.4_x86
102932-05 SunOS 5.3
The fix for this vulnerability was integrated in SunOS
5.7 (Solaris 7) before it was released.
automountd:
104654-05 SunOS 5.5.1
104655-05 SunOS 5.5.1_x86
103187-43 SunOS 5.5
103188-43 SunOS 5.5_x86
101945-61 SunOS 5.4
101946-54 SunOS 5.4_x86
101318-92 SunOS 5.3
SunOS 5.6 (Solaris 2.6) and SunOS 5.7 (Solaris 7) are not
vulnerable.
Sun security patches are available at:
http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/show.pl?target=patches/patch-li
cense&nav=pub-patches
_______________________________________________________________
Our thanks to Olaf Kirch of Caldera for his assistance in
helping us understand the problem and Chok Poh of Sun
Microsystems for his assistance in helping us construct this
advisory.
_______________________________________________________________
This document is available from:
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-99-05-statd-automountd.html.
_______________________________________________________________
[ End CERT Advisory ]
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge CERT for the information contained in this
bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________
For additional information or assistance, please contact CIAC:
CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a
global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
among computer security teams worldwide.
CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC
can be contacted at:
Voice: +1 925-422-8193
FAX: +1 925-423-8002
STU-III: +1 925-423-2604
E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov
For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites,
and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM -
8AM PST), use one of the following methods to contact CIAC:
1. Call the CIAC voice number 925-422-8193 and leave a message, or
2. Call 888-449-8369 to send a Sky Page to the CIAC duty person or
3. Send e-mail to 4498369@skytel.com, or
4. Call 800-201-9288 for the CIAC Project Leader.
Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are
available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive.
World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/
(or http://ciac.llnl.gov)
Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org
(or ciac.llnl.gov)
Modem access: +1 (925) 423-4753 (28.8K baud)
+1 (925) 423-3331 (28.8K baud)
CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic
publications:
1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical
information and Bulletins, important computer security information;
2. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector
(SPI) software updates, new features, distribution and
availability;
3. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the
use of SPI products.
Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package
called Majordomo, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To
subscribe (add yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the
following request as the E-mail message body, substituting
ciac-bulletin, spi-announce OR spi-notes for list-name:
E-mail to ciac-listproc@llnl.gov or majordomo@rumpole.llnl.gov:
subscribe list-name
e.g., subscribe ciac-bulletin
You will receive an acknowledgment email immediately with a confirmation
that you will need to mail back to the addresses above, as per the
instructions in the email. This is a partial protection to make sure
you are really the one who asked to be signed up for the list in question.
If you include the word 'help' in the body of an email to the above address,
it will also send back an information file on how to subscribe/unsubscribe,
get past issues of CIAC bulletins via email, etc.
PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing
communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these
communities, please contact your agency's response team to report
incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide
organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their
constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/.
This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or
usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately
owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products,
process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or
otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement,
recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the
University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed
herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States
Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for
advertising or product endorsement purposes.
LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC)
J-035: Linux Blind TCP Spoofing
J-036: LDAP Buffer overflow against Microsoft Directory Services
J-037: W97M.Melissa Word Macro Virus
J-038: HP-UX Vulnerabilities (hpterm, ftp)
J-039: HP-UX Vulnerabilities (MC/ServiceGuard & MC/LockManager, DES
J-040: HP-UX Security Vulnerability in sendmail
J-041: Cisco IOS(R) Software Input Access List Leakage with NAT
J-042: Web Security
J-043: (bulletin in process)
J-044: Tru64/Digital UNIX (dtlogin) Security Vulnerability
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.0 Business Edition
iQCVAwUBN2E1qrnzJzdsy3QZAQHcqQQAzStiURTt0eWZTvrLlPeNIVyNyshW4bpP
vz5J1hum0BRYVdSAD07iGfdjooGJrKSGQY7PhvFskOK/ylbrx/tAhkdcvz423Mvw
y7lUN9RlMV3W0nxYTF75+IIr1CM1x6GP6Ahj+G+b8FwNojY0JQWdXj2AbKUrXEC5
Xk8uCoJIehM=
=Vkr8
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 1999 15:43:33 -0400
From: Nadeem Riaz <nads@bleh.org>
To: BUGTRAQ@netspace.org
Subject: Re: CERT Advisory CA-99.05 - statd-automountd
Hi,
Is there a more complete list of systems that are or are not vulnerable
to these latest security holes. The advisory implies that only vendors who
responded with information are in the list of vulnerable or non-vulnerable
operating systems. Are the statd's shipped with the latest version of RedHat
(6.0) or FreeBSD-stable (3.2) vulnerable? -- Thanks
-- Nadeem Riaz
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 1999 17:37:10 -0400
From: Scott Cromar <cromar@PRINCETON.EDU>
To: BUGTRAQ@netspace.org
Subject: Re: CERT Advisory CA-99.05 - statd-automountd
Re: the SunOS 4.1.4 dimension of this problem:
Sun tells me that patch 102516-06 and later protect against this issue.
(This response was in reaction to Sun Service Order 3993470.) I am not in
a position to check the validity of their response.
--Scott
On Thu, 10 Jun 1999, Mark Zielinski wrote:
> This CERT Advisory has failed to mention a few things that I would like to
> point out.
>
> CERT Advisory CA-99.05 reports SunOS 5.6 automountd as not being susceptible
> to the rpc.statd bounce attack. This is incorrect. SunOS 5.6 is indeed
> vulnerable, it is just harder to exploit because it involves DNS spoofing.
>
> Solaris 7 is not vulnerable because the RPC services are no longer run as
> root and automountd will only accept connections from a uid of zero. This
> has nothing to due with Sun incorporating a patch into version 7.
>
> System Administrators should also consider the following. A system
> running SunOS 5.5.1 with a patched automountd (that has not patched rpc.statd)
> is STILL vulnerable. This is because the automountd patch for SunOS 5.5.1
> only stops non-root local users from specifying the command to be run for
> mounting filesystems. Any system running rpc.statd in this situation as
> root (which is default) can still be exploited remotely.
>
> System administrators should also take note that simply disabling rpcbind
> will not stop this problem from being exploited.
>
> Both SUN Microsystems and CERT fail to mention that earlier versions of
> SunOS are also affected. I understand that most systems these days are
> not running these versions, however patches and advisories should still be
> released for those who are running them.
>
> SunOS versions 4.1.3 and 4.1.4 are still vulnerable to the rpc.statd
> bounce attack with no patches currently released.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Mark Zielinski
> System Security Engineer
> Inficad Communications
© 2022 Packet Storm. All rights reserved.
%7Cutmcsr%3D(direct)%7Cutmcmd%3D(none)){kind=small}
Follow us on Twitter
Follow us on Facebook
Subscribe to an RSS Feed